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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

ELIZA RUE WOOD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.THEO N. WOOD and
RUTH L. WOOD,
Defendan.ts a.nd Respon.dents.

Case
No. 8886

APPELLANT.'S REP·LY BRIEF

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Since the respondents' preliminary statement of the
case might lead to a misimpression, the appellant wishes
to direct the Court's attention to the record at pages 101
and 102, wherein it is indicated that the Trial Court
directed a verdict in favor of the defendants upon the
sole ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The following is also
found in the record at page 102:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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MR. ALLEN: Will the Court also announce
whether or not it considered the other grounds
of the defendants' motion~ I believe they were
well taken-the record will support them.
THE COURT: The Court will rule no further
than that it considers the evidence to show contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
~IR. ALLE~:

Thank you, your Honor.

Respondents in their brief have indicated the desire
to extend the scope of review to the issues of '' assumption of risk of the appellant'' and also the presence or
absence of duties o·wing to appellant. Appellant has no
objection to this broadening of the scope of review so
long as it is clearly understood that the Trial Court
ruled, solely, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and no further, notwithstanding the other grounds urged by respondents in
support of their motion for a directed verdict in their
favor.
REPLY TO RESPONDEXTS' ST_\TE:JIEXT
OF F~\CTS
Referring to the position of the car belonging to
appellant's husband immediately prior to the time the
car lights were turned off, respondents' brief makes the
statement that:
''In such position, the headlights of the automobile would shine into and w-ould illuminate the
garage through which appellant thereafter proceeded.''
(The middle of page 3)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The record states that the husband parked his car
facing toward the pillar separating the two garage doorways (R. 45, Lines 13 through 15). Also, the left garage
door was closed and a car was parked in the right half
of the garage (Exhibit 1-P). No doubt the headlights
of the car would illuminate the left-hand door and the
rear of the automobile parked in the garage. However,
and owing to the size of the automobile parked in the
garage, there would be little chance for the headlights
to "illuminate" the interior of the garage, and particularly that portion which included the stairwell. See
Exhibit 4-P.
With reference to the record quoted in the respondents' brief at pages 3, 4 and 5, it is to be observed that
at no time did the appellant, in her testimony, admit any
kind of knowledge of an unguarded stairwell. Further,
the quan.tum and kind of knowledge which the appellant
possessed as to the existence of a stairwell somewhere
in the respondents' garage has been dealt with at length
in appellant's previous brief at pages 4, 5, 6, 13, 14 and
18. It is most important to note that such knowledge
as the appellant had of the existence of amy kind of stairwell in the garage, immediately prior to the time of the
accident, was forgotten, owing to the appellant's overwhelming mental preoccupation with the pending marriage of her granddaughter. From the record at page 78,
beginning at line 26, the respondent, Mrs. Wood, testified:
"Thco asked her if she (appellant) didn't
remember that the stairwell was there, and she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

said Yes, but because she had been so upset over
this wedding that she had temporarily forgotten.''
The statement is made in respondents' brief at page
5 thereof that:
"It is not rebutted in this record that neither
of the respondents expected the appellant to use
the garage to enter the home.'' ( T. 66, 78.)
It is of interest to note in the record at page 74 (T.
66) that respondent, ~Irs. Wood, testified that she
assumed visitors to their home would choose whatever
door they wished to enter the house. (The real issue, of
course, is what a reasonable man might anticipate.)
At the lower third of page 5 of the respondents'
brief the statement is made that:
"She (appellant) had two known alternate
safe routes to travel into the home ... ''
It should be noted, however, that the other two
alternate routes consisted of following a path clear
around the garage to the rear of the home and selecting
a path to the front door of the darkened living room.
Both alternate paths were dark since it was nighttime
and the paths were unlighted. Rather than select either
of these alternate dark paths, appellant choose the most
direct route and the only route from which she sa-w any
light at all.
The first six lines on page 6 of respondents' brief
nre fully rebutted by the middle paragraph on page 16
of n ppellant 's prcYious brief.
4
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT
OF POINTS
POINT 1. THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE LAW
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT.
A. The Appellant is Admitted to Have Been a Licensee
on Respondents' Premises, But the Respondents Did
Owe Duties of Care to Appellant and Did Breach
These Duties, to Appellant's Damage.
B. Appellant Had Some "Knowledge" That in Fact a
Stairwell Existed in Respondents' Garage, But She
Had No Knowledge That the Stairwell Was Unguarded and Was Not Provided With a Protective
Railing Which She Was Told Would Be Installed
Around the Stairwell. She is Not Therefore Chargeable, as a Matter of Law, With Contributory N egligence or Assumption of Risk.
C. Appellant Proceeded Into a Darkened Area, But
Toward the Light Which Emanated From the Rear
Portion of Respondents' Home Where Respondents
Indicated They Would Be, and Chose Not to Follow
Either of Two Alternate Routes Which Were Totally
Dark. She is Therefore Not to be Charged With
Assumption of Risk or Contributory Negligence, as
a ~latter of Law.

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE LAW
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT.
A. The Appellant is Admitted to Have Been a Licensee
on Respondents' Premises, But the Respondents Did
Owe Duties of Care to Appellant and Did Breach
These Duties, to Appellant's Damage.
It is conceded that the appellant occupied the position of guest-licensee on the premises of the respondents.
The law given by respondents in their brief needs considerable enlargement and qualification as regard the
duties owed to a guest-licensee by host-licensors.
A host's duties to a social guest (licensee) are as
follows:
(1) Not to injure, by active or affirmative negligence, a guest whose presence is known.
Sanders v. Bro1rn, 73

~lriz.

116, 238 P. 2d 941,

1lfcNamara v. Hall, 38 ·\rash. 2d 864, 233 P. 2d 852.
(2) Not to set a trap or pitfaU for the gu-est.

Gudwin v. Gudwin, 14 Conn. Supp. 147,
Pa.ge v. J!m·phy, 194 l\Iinn. 607, 261 :N.\Y. 443,
Roth

'l'.

Prudential Life Insurance Company, 266

App. Div. 872, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 592,
Bugcja v. Butzc, 1941 Supp. App. T .. 26 N.Y.S.

2d 989,
6
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Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834,
Pitt v. Jackson, (1939), 1 All Eng. 129.
(3) To warn against or remove defects which the

host knows are likely to coose harm to the guest and
which he has reason to believe the guest is not likely to
discover for himself.
Sanders v. Brown, Supra,
Loobe v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A. 2d 693
(see especially),
Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So. 2d 883 (see especially),
Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 45 A. 2d 491,
Faber v. Meiler, 278 App. Div. 849, 104 N.Y.S. 2d
485,
Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E. 2d
453,
Rushton v. Winters, 331 Pa. 78, 200 A. 60 (see
especially),
McNamara v. Hall, Supra.
( 4) And generally not to cause injury by gross
negligence (i.e., want of slight care), recklessness, or
wanton and wilful misconduct.

Sanders v. Brown, Supra,
Barman v. Spencer, (Ind.), 49 N.E. 9 (see especially at p. 12, 2nd col.), 44 L.R.A. 815.
See in the above regard, 25 A.L.R. 2d, 598-628.
It is believed those duties above emphasized 1n
italics are duties which the respondents owed to appel7
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lants, and breached by the maintenance of their dangerous stairwell. Appellant wishes to discuss each of
these duties in order.
( 1) Maintenance by Respondents of the Unguarded
Stairwell Constituted a Trap or Pitfall.
The doctrine of ''trap'' or ''pitfall'' has evolved to
become something quite different than its original concept. Prosser recites that:
"While this phrase originally was used in the
sense of presenting an appearance of safety where
it did not exist, the significance which finally became attached to it was not one of intent to injure
or even of acti,~e conduct, but was merely that the
possessor of land was under an obligation to disclose to the licensee any concealed dangerous conditions of the premises of which he had knowledge.''
Again:
''The duty is not to maintain the land in safe
condition, but to exercise reasonable care to see
that warning is given.''
Prosser au Torts, 1941 Edition at pages 631 and
632.
It is to be noted that for a trap to exist, no intent
to injure need be shown.
Shypulski v. 1T'" a1dorf Paper Products Company,
232 l\1:inn. 394, 45 N.\V. 2d 549.

8
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As to traps the following is mentioned in the case
of McHenry v. Howells, 201 Ore. 697, 272 P. 2d 210, at
page 213:
''As to plaintiff, defendants were subject to
the rule of law that liability of an owner or occupant of premises to a licensee may be predicated
upon negligence in leaving something in the
nature of a trap or pitfall at a place where his
presence might have been anticipated, without a
warning thereof. A trap within the meaning of
this rule is a danger which a person who does not
know the premises could not avoid by reasonable
care and skill." (65 C.J.S., Negligence, paragraph
38, page 503.)
An example of a "trap" or "pitfall" is given 1n
the case of Castro v. Sutter Creek Union High School
District, 25 C.A. 2d 372, 77P. 2d 509 wherein the court
held that a hole 3:Y2 feet in width and 2:Y2 feet deep disposed between the sidewalk and curb of school property
constituted a "trap" for which a young lady, falling
into the same one night after a school dance and sustaining injuries therefrom, could recover.
It is, of course, true that if, in the present case, the
appellant had positive knowledge of the existence of an
ungua.rded stairwell in respondents' garage, the doctrine
of trap would not apply. However, the evidence clearly
indicated that the appellant was assured by respondents
some nine months prior to the accident that a protective
railing was going to be installed around the stairwell.
This was not done, but the respondent never informed
appellant as to this fact. It would have been an easy
9
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/

thing for her daughter-in-law to have informed the
appellant in their telephone conversation on the morning
of the accident to be careful of the unguarded stairwell
and to tell her that, as yet, the promised protective railing had not been installed. Such was not done.
There is some testimony, though not without slight
contradiction, that the respondent, Mrs. Wood, assumed
that her mother-in-law would use the front door of
respondents' home, on the evening in question. However, the test of reasonableness here must be applied
and it is felt that a jury should determine whether or
not a reasonable man could foresee that there was a
possibility that appellant would proceed directly to the
den of the residence where the family indicated they
would be (taking the route through the open doorway
of the garage which was the closest route she could have
taken and in a direction where she saw light}, rather
than choose alternate routes which were both longer to
her point of destination and shrouded in the darkness
of night.
With regard to the doctrine of trap or pitfall the
language of Tempest v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299
P. 2d 124, is of interest. In that case, heretofore referred
to by both appellant and respondents, the accident happened on an interior stairway access to which was
arhieved through a door. The Court noted:

''It is general knowledge that a great many
homes haYe rooms on different levels which are
reached by stairways and to build a stairway with
a door opening forward is not a trap or pitfall."
10
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With this statement of the Tempest case the appellant agrees ; however, there is a vast difference between
the stairway in that case and the unguarded pit which
respondents caused to be built in their garage immediately adjacent the entrance thereto and next to the door
of the den on the east side of the garage. Reference is
now made to Exhibits 2-P and 4-P. In viewing these
exhibits the appellant is certain the Court will be impressed as to how the stairwell fits the description of a
"pitfall", for not only is there an approximately eight
foot drop-off immediately adjacent to the garage doorway, but also the respondents constructed a "tripping"
rise approximately four inches high (See Exhibit 2-P)
so that, should one happen to stub his toe on this rise
or rail, he or she would automatically plunge over the
eight foot precipice.
In brief, appellant feels that jury questions are
presented relative to the doctrine of trap as to (1)
whether or not the respondents as reasonable people
ought to have suspicioned that, conceivably, their mother
might take a direct route through an open doorway of
the garage to the lighted den and (2) whether in fact
the appellant lacked sufficient knowledge so as to be
chargeable with actual or constructive knowledge of an
open unguarded stairwell, particularly where the testimony indicated that she had subjectively forgotten even
of the existence of a stairwell immediately prior to her
entrance into the garage. As to the forgetfulness aspect,
reference is now made to the appellant's previous brief
at pages 18-22 and the cases therein cited.
11
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( 2) The Respondents Owed a Duty to the Appellant to
Warn Against or Remove Defect Which the Host
Knows is Likely to Cause Harm to the Guest and
Which He Has Reason to Believe the Guest is Not
Likely to Discover for Himself.
The reasoning and cases cited with reference to the
doctrine of trap it is believed apply also to this duty.
The reason why the textwriters seem to list two separate
duties is that in some instances in a small minority of
jurisdictions the old strict doctrine of trap (including
malicious intent) is still applied. Where the liberal
Prosser view and the majority rule is used with reference to the trap doctrine then the doctrine of trap would
appear almost to merge with this second duty enumerated. In appellant's opinion, one is certainly awed at
looking at Exhibits 2-P and 5-P that the danger apparent in maintaining such an unguarded pit into which
one might easily fall. Further, at night time the pit
would be difficult to obserYe from the exterior since car
lights shining on the front of the garage would strike
that portion of the garage which conceals the stairwell.
( 3) Respondents Were Grossly X egligent as to Appellant.
The maintenance by the respondents of the stairwellpit in the garage on their premises, while perhaps not
amounting to wilful and wanton misconduct, certainly
bespeaks gross negligence.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is generally accepted that gross negligence is distinguished from mere negligence in aggrevation or degree, and is equivalent to "want of slight care."

Prosser on Torts, Supra, p. 259,
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403, 5 Ky. L.R. 397,
Peavy v. Pea.vy, 36 Ga. App. 202 at 204, 136 S.E.
96 (see especially).
Thus, if a host-licensor allowed a small rut to exist
in an anticipated pathway which the guest-licensee might
use, it is believed that this would be an act of simple
negligence for which the host-licensor would not be
liable. But there is a vast difference in degree between
a small rut in a roadway or walkway and an eight foot
cement pit which the respondents maintained at the
front of their garage immediately adjacent to a door
leading to the living quarters of the residence. Reference again is made to Exhibit 2-P. Certainly a business
invitee would be permitted to recover at law against his
business host if the host were to permit the existence
of a rut into the established place of business. The
maintenance of the rut would be an act of simple negligence. But the maintenance of the stairwell on the respondents' premises is believed to be much more shocking to the conscience of those who expect at least some
minimum of care in the maintenance of premises so
that members of the family or those in their shoes will
not suffer injury. In the present case the appellant was
a member of the respondents' family, being the mother
of one of the respondents, and being such is entitled to

13
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some type of warning that the respondents had failed
to surround the extremely dangerous stairwell with a
protective enclosure, as promised, or at least to be
apprised of this gross danger.
B. Appellant Had Some "Knowledge" That in Fact a
Stairwell Existed in Respondents' Garage, But She
Had No Knowledge That the Stairwell Was Unguarded and Was Not Provided With a Protective
Railing Which She Was Told Would Be Installed
Around the Stairwell. She is Not Therefore Chargeable, as a Matter of Law, With Contributory Negli·
gence or Assumption of Risk.
Not wishing to multiply words, appellant answers
respondents' argument by merely referring again to
pages 12, 13, 14 and 18 of the appellant's previous brief.
By virtue of previous argument given it will be readily
seen that the import of the record cited at page 11 of
respondents' brief must be seriously qualified and discounted in view of her past experience and in view of
the fact that she had, by respondents' testimony, for·
gotten of the stairwell at the time of the accident.
As to assumption of risk appellant agrees that the
law given in this section of respondents' brief is the
law to be applied. HoweYer, and referring to sub-section
e of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 340
(See page 12 in respondents' brief), it will be noted tha.t
there was clearly no assumption of risk by the appellant
since she didn't ''know'' of the true condition of the
premises, by Yirtue of the fact that she was previously
14
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advised a protective railing was to be installed around
the stairwell, and she was not thereafter informed that
such had in fact not been done. Afortiori, one cannot
assume a risk of which he lacks knowledge.
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is the
necessity for inquiring into the appellant's state of mind
as to the appellant's ''awareness of the situation and his
realization of the risks to which he exposes himself."
See comment a of Section 893, Restatement of the Law
of Torts. To be guilty of assumption of risk, the appellant must have had a reasonably accurate apprehension
of the risk she was assuming. In the present case, at the
time of the accident the plaintiff had forgotten about the
existence and location of the stairwell (see the record at
page 70, lines 26 through 29). There can be no assumption of risk of a danger one has forgotten. Further, the
plaintiff was informed by her own daughter-in-law that
an iron railing would be placed around the dangerous
stairwell. See the record at page 75, line 30 through
page 76, line 10. Immediately prior to the accident the
appellant did not know of the presence or absence of
the promised iron railing. Lack of information on this
point on the part of the appellant could not possibly
render her guilty of assumption of risk since she did not
possess an awareness that risk was even involved.
C. Appellant Proceeded into a Darkened Area, But
Toward the Light Which Emanated From the Rear
Portion of Respondents' Home Where Respondents
Indicated They Would Be, and Chose Not to Follow
Either of Two Alternate Routes Which Were Totally

15
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Dark. She is Therefore Not to Be Charged With
Assumption of Risk or Contributory Negligence, as
a Matter of Law.
As to respondents' parenthetical remark at pages
13 and 14, it is deemed sufficient to answer that there is
no evidence whatever that, were the lights even to be
left on, the stairwell would have been illuminated. Furthermore, appellant's husband not the appellant was in
charge of the automobile and its light controls, and she
could not possibly be charged with her husband's negligence, even if he were negligent.
There is no evidence whatever that the two alternate routes available to the appellant, the route leading
around to the back of the house and the route to the
front door, were safe. In fact, both routes were totally
dark since it was nighttime and the appellant, rather
than choose either of these two dark routes, chose to
follow the light which she saw emanating from the den
and thus proceeded to the den in the most direct route
available. The comment cannot be resisted that if respondents were content to have constructed and to maintain an unguarded eight foot preripire at the entrance
of their garage at the open doorway thereof and next to
a door leading into the liYing quarters of the residence,
what might they not do on the grounds exterior of the
home?
At page 15 of respondents' brief, opposing counsel
urges the applicability of the following automobile rases
to ihe present stainn'll rase and ritc•s in support of his
contentions the following:
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Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P.
304;
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80
Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309;
Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366.

The Dalley case lays down the ''Assured Clear Distance Rule" for the State of Utah. In the Nikoleropoulos
case the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck down by the
defendants' automobile traveling in the same direction
as the plaintiff on State Street in Salt Lake City, a street
at that time traveled by both vehicles and pedestrians.
In the Dalley case the defendants had left a truck
parked, without lights, on the traveled portion of the
Zion Park Highway. In the Hansen case the defendants
had constructed a barricade to prevent highway traffic
from turning off onto a newly constructed highway which
had not been completed. In all three cases the danger
"\Vas foreseeable, to-wit, the traveling pedestrian, a
parked truck and a barricade, all normally associated
with streets, highways and travel thereon. Even in the
case of Tempest v. Richardson, the Court pointed out
with respect to foreseeability that "it is general knowledge that a great many homes have rooms on different
levels which are reached by stairways ... " Thus, as it
is with primary negligence, so it is with contributory
negligence: In order to be operative, the risk to the
plaintiff must be foreseeable to her and the result must
come within the risk created.
Neglect for the moment any effect that any past
experience the appellant has had with the respondents'

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

garage and stauwell. On entering a darkened garage
she can only be charged with constructive knowledge
that she might trip over objects lying on the garage
floor, or else bump into objects standing thereon. (This
is exactly like the automobile cases above quoted wherein
the law charged foreseeability on the part of the plaintiff to natural objects on highways, to-wit, pedestrians,
parked trucks and barricades.) In the present case, in
the absence of definite knowledge on the part of the
appellant as to the presence and location of the stairwell, the law does not construct foreseeability on the
part of the appellant relative to pitfalls or darkened
stairwells. The appellant, by her act of entering the
darkened garage, did not unreasonably assume the risk
of an unprotected stairwell.

ANSWER TO

ARGU~IENT

OF RESPONDENTS

The respondents' discounting of the importance of
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, et al., 69 S. Ct. 413, 336 U.S.
53, 93 L. Ed. 497, cited at page 10 of appellant's previous
brief and page 16 of respondents' brief, is deemed fully
answered by the cases in comment given on page 10 of
appellant's previous brief.
Respondents recite that Deacy r. JlcDonnell, 131
Conn. 101, 38 A. 2d 181, presents a "questionable rule"
of law. Interestingly enough, the Deacy case appears
to be the weight of authority. See the numerous cases
cited at pages 19 through 22 of appellant ·s previous
brief.
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Respondents also make note on page 17 of their
brief that the Deacy case was presented and argued to
this Court in the recent case of Tempest v. Richardson.
This is true ; however, the Deacy case was argued on
pages 16 and 17 of respondents' brief in the Tempest
case only on the question of duty of the host-licensor to
guest-licensee and not on the issue of the effect of forgetfulness on the issue of contributory negligence (on
which point it was presented on pages 18 through 20 of
appellant's previous brief). On the operative effect of
forgetfulness, the respondents' brief is silent; compare
with appellant's brief, pp. 18-22.
CONCLUSION
Questions of negligence, contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and primary duty which reasonable
men might decide differently in applying the ''reasonable man standard'' to the facts of the case are questions
of ultimate fact which- certainly in the present case fall within the province of the jury to decide.
CORRECTION
Kindly substitute "recovery" for "respectfully"
in the second from last line on p. 24 of appellant's previous brief.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
M. RALPH SHAFFER
for EVANS & NESLEN
Attorneys for Appellant.
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